Hashem has chosen not to spell out every detail of every way to apply His Holy Scriptures. For example, He has commanded,

• Genesis 9:5-6 HCSB  I will require the life of every animal and every man for your life and your blood. I will require the life of each man's brother for a man's life.  (6)  Whoever sheds man's blood, his blood will be shed by man, for God made man in His image.

He gave us a broad command and left it up to us as to how to obey it. In order to fairly and equitably obey this and many other of Hashem’s mitzvoth, we understand that (though it is not spelled out) we must:

• Choose men and women of character to be our judges. 
  
• Establish a court system and 
  
• Have some way to enforce or enact the judges’ orders.
  

But how does one go from broad principle to specific application? The word “middot” literally means “measures” but is used in the sense of “rules of inference and interpretation”. The following middot are some elders may use to interpret and apply the Scriptures.

These stem from research into Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen middot, developed in the 2nd century AD. However, following the necessities of kabalah and masoret, we have been adding to them as we have sought new, modern applications.

In general, these are used to:

• Reconstruct a forgotten source of halakhot
• Show that a particular halakhic practice is consistent with Scriptural principles even when it is not specifically mentioned in the Scriptures.

The rules of derivation can be generally subdivided into two categories:
    A. Midrash Hamekish -derivations based on comparisons.
    B. Midrash Hamevaer- derivations based on textual explanations.

• Qal va ch’omer - Literally "easy and hard".
  

This is the same as “a fortiori” which is from the Latin, meaning "even more so; by a stronger reason". 

• Whatever can be affirmed about the less probable can be affirmed with even greater force about the more probable. 
• We find a similar law in a more lenient case; how more so should that law apply to our stricter case!
• The reverse is also true. If a lenient ruling applies to a stringent law, then certainly that lenient ruling applies to a lenient law!
• If a rule or fact applies in a situation where there is relatively little reason for it to apply, certainly it applies in a situation where thre 
  

Qal va ch’omer can be used in either direction; i.e., to apply a more lenient interpretation to B based on its being true of A, or to apply a more stringent interpretation of A based on its being true of B. 

Eleven examples of Qal va ch'omer or a fortiori recorded in the Tanakh include:

1. Genesis 44:4-8 - Joseph's brothers saying "If we brought you back the money how could we be thieves?"
   
2. Exodus 6:12 - Moses saying "If Israel won't listen, how will Pharaoh?" Or  "If Israel for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is detrimental will not listen." Also,  Moses described himself as possessing "blocked lips" (Exodus 4:10). Back in the day no one with a speech defect would have been allowed to speak before the Pharaoh or his court. Of course this would not be an issue for the common people. So Moses may have been using Qal va ch'omer in the sense, "If Israel, which has no proscriptions against those who stutter, will not listen, certainly Pharaoh before whom no one who is defective may even appear, will not listen." 
   
3. Numbers 12:14 - Yahweh comparing the consequences of Miriam's disrespect to Hashem to disrespecting her human father.  When Miriam was disgraced by God for her slander of Moshe, she was sent out of the camp for 7 days. God said to Moshe, "If her father had spit in her face, she would be shamed for 7 days."[1] from which we can easily infer that if 7 days is the "shame period" for being disgraced by her father, then qal va ch’omer dictates that she should at the very least be shamed for 7 days if disgraced by God. So Yahweh was actually being VERY lenient!
   
4. Deuteronomy 31:27 - Moses saying "If you rebel while I'm alive, how much more once I'm dead?"
   
5. 1 Samuel 23:3 - David's men saying "If we're afraid here at home, how will we do among our sworn enemies?"
   
6. Esther 9:11 - The king saying to Esther "If 500 men were killed in my own fortress, how many more have been killed in all the provinces?"
   
7. Proverbs 11:31 - Solomon saying "If the tzaddikim will be repaid on the earth, how much more the rashaim?"
   
8. Jeremiah 12:5 - Here we have two different ones with similar meaning. Yahweh said to Jeremiah "If you can't run with humans how are you going to run with horses? If you stumble where the way is smooth, how will you do in the thickets?"
   
9. Ezekiel 15:5 Adonai saying to the prophet, "If when it was whole it was useless, how much less not that it is charred and devoured by fire?"
   
10. Ezekiel 33:24 - The Lord rebuking the people for saying "If Abraham was only one person and possessed the land, how much more may many regain possession?" Their argument was a perversion of qal va ch’omer because it misses the point. Abraham did not receive the land by virture of his own efforts but through Yahweh. Their argument that the many who remained dwelling in the ruins could retake the land based on their numbers and strength was thus fatuous.
11. Jonah 4:10-11 Yahweh asks the prophet Jonah, "If you care for a plant, shouldn't I care about a whole city of humans?" 

Example: If picky Mikey likes this cereal then most likely anyone else would like it. 

Example: "I feel that it is my civic duty to pay my taxes as well as my other bills, and that it is my moral duty to make an honest declaration of my income to the income tax authorities. But I do not feel that I and my fellow citizens have a religious duty to sacrifice our lives in war on behalf of our own state, and, a fortiori, I do not feel that we have an obligation or a right to kill and maim citizens of other states or to devastate their land." - Arnold Toynbee

Example: Suppose that Tommy is Timmy's older brother. We can argue that if Tommy is too young to see a certain movie, then qal va ch’omer, Timmy is too young, as well, since he is even younger than Tommy.

Example: You have already agreed with me that it is wrong to kill animals in order to produce food. Therefore, qal va ch’omer, it is also wrong to kill animals for something much less important, like belts or coats.

Example: If something is forbidden on an ordinary festival, it is much more so on Yom Ha Kippur. If it's a allowed on Yom Ha Kippur, then it's certainly allowed on lesser festivals or Shabbat. 

While it would seem that qal va ch’omer is a purely logical process - and thus should not be included as one of the principles of derivation - it is included as such since its use is predicated on a base whose law is known from the Torah. This base law is then compared to another law, giving us information about the latter.

The advantage of qal va chomer’s logical base is that an elder can use it without first having to establish that it is based on received tradition. However, another elder may contest the ruling’s validity by refuting the underlying logic. Qal va ch’omer’s use is thus dependent on the degree of halakhic knowledge the elder using it has.

There are a number of other restrictions that govern the use of qal va ch’omer. 

• Dayo lavo min hadin lihyos kanadun – the derived law must be equivalent to the law from which it was derived; i.e. if we apply a law to X based on its being true of Y, the application to X cannot be any more stringent than it is for Y.
  

Example: Say my ox damaged some of your property while in the public domain – out in the street – and say the elders assessed the damages to be x amount. Now let’s say my ox actually came on your property and ate your bushes while there. Damage on your personal property would carry greater liability than damage in the public domain, therefore the elders should assess the damages at 2x. 

Qal va ch’omer may not be used to draw a comparison from a law based on halakha le Moshe mi-Sinai. 

Even the wisest of rabbis cannot overturn devar mishnah law as given to us by Moses on Mount Sinai. Our rulings may not overturn the revealed law of God. 

• Bin Onshin Min Hadin- Qal va ch’omer cannot be used to establish punishment; i.e., the penalty imposed upon one who violates the original law cannot be assumed to apply to the derived law.
  

• Qal va ch'omer meforash 
  

Argumentum a minori ad majus, or vice versa, and expressly so characterized in the text. 

• Qal va ch'omer statum 
  

Argumentum a minori ad majus, or vice versa, but not explicitly declared to be one in the text.

• Gezera shava – analogy by common term or similarity in phrase.
  

Argument from analogy. When the Torah uses a similar (usually uncommon) term or phrase in two places, it demonstrates a connection, such that information about one case may be applied to the analogue. The usual formula used is “here it is said…there it is said; As here…so there.” 

Sometimes Gezera shava is rendered as “Ke yotzei bo mimakom ac'her” - "like it says elsewhere" – indicating that the explanation of a word in the text of interest is clarified by use of same word in an unrelated text.

In arguments using gezera shava we find a similar law in a verse containing a similar phrase to one in our verse and argue that the same principles apply though the general context may differ. Such analogy enables us to assume that the lessons we have learned in one instance may apply in many different instances. 

However, such conclusions do not in general afford certainty but only a degree of probability. 

There are two principle reasons for using gezerah shavah. First, it can be used as a means of clarifying the text; as an aid to determine a more precise understanding of an ambiguous expression.

Example: Clarifying slavery laws - The law restricting slavery in Exodus 21:2 is unclear as to which type of slave is intended: a Gentile slave of a Jewish master or a Jewish slave of a Jewish master. However, in Deuteronomy 15:12, where the same law is repeated, the servant is clearly identified as “your fellow Hebrew.” Therefore, we interpret Exodus 21:2 as applying to fellow Jews and not necessarily to Gentiles. 

Second, gezerah shavah can be used as a means of establishing a halakha not specifically mentioned in the text. Gezera shava is most often used to decide a case not expressly provided for. For instance, the complexities of modern genetic or reproductive sciences are not expressly treated in the Scriptures. However, using gezera shava, we may derive principles that can give direction to the posek.

Example: Afflicting our souls - Consider the following. In Leviticus 16:29, in treating the Day of Atonement, we are commanded to “afflict our souls” or “practice self-denial” but it does not clearly define what form this affliction should take. However, we see the same expression in other passages (i.e. Deuteronomy 8:3 or Psalm 35:13) which indicate fasting. Therefore, we take our passage’s meaning to include fasting. 

Example: Remembering important events - We are told to "remember" what Amalek did to us when we left Egypt[2] and we are told to "remember" (nizkarim) the Purim story.[3] Since we already know that remembering Amalek must take place by reading from the Tanakh, then gezera shava, we apply that reasoning to the Megilla and decide to read the Purim story.

Example: Paid and volunteer - The heirs of a shomer sach’ar – a paid watchman – are not obligated to swear that their father had not used the item he had been paid to guard[4]  – a vow that the father alone would have to make if the item were accidentally destroyed while in his care.[5] Using gezerah shavah we can determine that this also applies to the heirs of a shomer ch’inam – an unpaid watchman – as well since Exodus 22:10-11 uses a phrase that can mean either paid or unpaid. Once the law freeing the heirs of the paid watchman can be derived, then the less stringent case of an unpaid watchman (who understandably is held less accountable) can (qal v’ ch’omer) be dealt with based on the use of the same phrase. 

Example: Suicide and assisted suicide - Every person whose suicide (assisted or not) was recorded in the Bible – King Saul,[6] Abimelech,[7] Ahithophel,[8] Zimri,[9] and Judas Iscariot[10]  - are shown to be living outside of fellowship with God at the time of their deaths, and are clearly not meant to be our examples. Therefore, though the Bible does not expressly forbid suicide, we understand that it is not Hashem’s will for His people to murder – even themselves. 

Example: Anencephalic baby – When asked if an anencephalic child may be aborted, based on a gezera shava argument my response was that God wants each person to be born. He has a plan for each person. They have worth and identity before they are even born, regardless of their physical condition,[11] simply because they are created in the image of God.[12] The Psalmist said that children are a reward from the Lord[13] and he did not limit that truth to healthy children.

There is an underlying principle of life in the Scriptures. Whenever we are given the choice God’s people should automatically choose life.[14] Human life is so valuable that God Himself chose to die in order to save us from an eternal death. That is why the crime of murder is so horrendous and must be dealt with without pity.[15] 

Paul warned us that we who are strong have an obligation to bear the weaknesses of those without strength.[16] In what way would this not apply to a child born with what is essentially a terminal illness?

If we think of the child as being essentially born with a terminal illness, then we are not obligated to treat what is basically futile to treat. It is impossible to restore the child’s brain. It is impossible to keep them alive in perpetuity. Therefore, there is no obligation to take heroic measures to save the child. However, as with all the dying, we are still required to offer comfort and dignity while the disease runs its course. We do not have to deny this baby’s personhood or remove the intrinsic quality of her humanity.

In this case, we applied three divine traits to provide direction for an issue that does not explicitly appear in Scripture. We took God’s apparent predisposition for saving lives as opposed to taking them; His repeated urging to take our difficulties in stride and simply bear them; and His command to ease the burden of the weak and afflicted; to conclude that we should: not abort the child; bring the child to term; provide comfort and allow it to die a natural death. 

Restrictions: Gezerah shavahhas a number of restrictions that govern its usage.

• Ein adam dan gezerah shavah l'atzmo - no one can draw a gezerah shavah comparison on his own.[17] 
  

The danger was pointed out by Rambam, “The principle of gezerah shavah is an instrument that could be used ad infinitum to refute all of the laws of the Torah.”[18] 

Example: For instance (though Adonaists consider the laws of ritual impurity maleh), do the laws of ritual impurity that apply to contact with a corpse apply to a dead insect? 

We should verify if there is a broad consensus among wise and godly believers on the matter. If we find ourselves way out in far left field, we should humbly consider that we might be off track.[19] 

• Both words or phrases used in the gezerah shavah must be from the Torah.
  

Need we add that both words or phrases used in a gezerah shavah argument must be from the same Scriptural language?

• Bin gezerah shavah lemachtzah – A partial comparison cannot be drawn. 
  

You cannot pick and choose. If a law applicable to X is applied to Y through the use of gezerah shavah, then all of the laws applicable to X must be applied to Y. 

Two other sub-categories of gezerah shavah would include:

• Hekesh – juxtaposition of cases 
  

This may be used when a number of cases are mentioned in a single passage. Through hekesh we can deduce that the law specified in one case applies to the juxtaposed cases as well. 

Example:

• Deuteronomy 22:26 HCSB  Do nothing to the young woman, because she is not guilty of an offense deserving death. This case is just like one in which a man attacks his neighbor and murders him.

The juxtaposition of rape and murder in the verse allows us to rule that one is permitted to kill in self-defense. 

Example:

• Deuteronomy 24:1-4 HCSB  "If a man marries a woman, but she becomes displeasing to him because he finds something improper about her, he may write her a divorce certificate, hand it to her, and send her away from his house.  (2)  If after leaving his house she goes and becomes another man's wife,  (3)  and the second man hates her, writes her a divorce certificate, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house or if he dies,  (4)  the first husband who sent her away may not marry her again after she has been defiled, because that would be detestable to the LORD. You must not bring guilt on the land the LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance.
  

Here we see two different topics are placed side by side so as to invite comparison. Rulings on the technical process of divorce and betrothal can be derived because the passage mentions divorce and betrothal in the same phrase, e.g. she shall depart (through divorce) and become betrothed. This juxtaposition implies that these changes in marital status are accomplished through similar legal procedures.  Example: 

• Exodus 21:26-27 HCSB  "When a man strikes the eye of his male or female slave and destroys it, he must let the slave go free in compensation for his eye.  (27)  If he knocks out the tooth of his male or female slave, he must let the slave go free in compensation for his tooth.
  

By saying that a slave should be freed for the loss of an eye or for a tooth, two very dissimilar issues (which would you rather lose, an eye or a tooth?) the Scriptures invite a ruling that a slave should be freed for ANY mutilation by his master. Example:

• Leviticus 18:9 HCSB  You are not to have sexual intercourse with your sister, either your father's daughter or your mother's, whether born at home or born elsewhere. You are not to have sex with her.
  
• Leviticus 18:12 HCSB  You are not to have sexual intercourse with your father's sister; she is your father's close relative.
  

A man may not marry his maternal half sister. And a man may not marry his father's sister. By applying the first to the second we understand that he may not marry his father's half-sister either. Hekesh is a comparison drawn by the Scriptures themselves, whereas gezerah shavah is a comparison drawn by the teacher or dayan. Understandably, the restriction that the Scriptures must clearly draw the comparison makes hekesh sometimes more difficult to use and thus gezerah shavah is more popular. However, because the connection has not be made by the Ruach’ ha Kodesh, then any ruling based on mere gezerah shavah is naturally more suspect than one based on hekesh.  

• Semuch’in – juxtaposition of subjects. 
  

Here a comparison is drawn on the basis of the proximity of two subjects. 

Example: For instance, Leviticus 20:13 tells us that homosexuality is an abomination and a capital crime. Dinah d’malchuta dinah precludes the use of capital punishment in our society. However, its proximity with another capital crime (v. 14) and in a long list of sexual crimes, equate the act with adultery, incest, and bestiality. 

On one hand semuch’in can be also be used to elevate adultery to the same level as incest or homosexuality; a ruling that many will shy away from yet remains nevertheless. On the other hand it indicates the seriousness with which Adonai considers each of these heinous acts. 

• Binyan Av – Analogy by common theme or concept.
  

Sometimes this called mah matzinu, which means “what have we found?” This is also an interpretation by analogy, either by one or two Scriptures: We find a similar law in another case, why shouldn't we assume that the same law applies here? Unlike gezera shava, this analogizes from the theme rather than a specific word or phrase. In some cases when using gezera shava (if in case A law X applies; then in similar case B, law X also applies), someone may argue that the differences of the context may preclude the use of gezera shava. The posek may then choose to move to binyan av which argues from theme (not only is the same phrase found but theme X is also found) in order to bolster his argument. At this point the opponent may argue against this inference, finding some law which applies to that case but not to ours. 

There are two forms of binyan av; mikasuv ech’ad, a conclusion drawn from a single verse, and mishnei kesuvim, a conclusion drawn from two or more verses. 

Example:  

• Deuteronomy 19:15 HCSB  "One witness cannot establish any wrongdoing or sin against a person, whatever that person has done. A fact must be established by the testimony of two or three witnesses.

The use of the singular “witness” would seem to make “one” superfluous. However, mikasuv ech’ad may cause us to believe (because we believe there is nothing superfluous in the Scriptures), that if the word “witness” is used elsewhere without the qualifying “one” the reference may mean more than one witness even though the singular form is used. 

Example:

• Deuteronomy 23:24-25 HCSB  "When you enter your neighbor's vineyard, you may eat as many grapes as you want until you are full, but you must not put any in your container.  (25)  When you enter your neighbor's standing grain, you may pluck heads of grain with your hand, but you must not put a sickle to your neighbor's grain.

These two verses would, at first glance, seem to run contrary to our common sense of honesty. Who wants their neighbor coming into their field and eating their produce? However, by connecting the two verses (using mishnei kesuvim), we may derive that the point is that even if (driven by hunger) we were to eat of our neighbor’s produce, we may not harm our neighbor’s essential ability to continue making his living. 

Example: I applied mishnei kesuvim to this passage a couple years ago. An Indian believer was suffering persecution. He and his family were starving and could not find work in their predominantly Hindu environment. Their neighbors were also believers. Unfortunately, the neighbors disappeared one night when a gang of masked men invaded their house. They had not been seen since. His question was if he and his family could use his spiritual brother’s belongings in order to stay alive or even escape a similar fate. I suggested that he did not know for a fact that his neighbor was dead. Perhaps he was languishing in prison somewhere. What a shame it would be if the neighbor or someone from the neighbor’s family would manage to escape confinement, wend their way back home, only to find their house and tools were all gone! Based on a mishnei kesuvim interpretation of Deuteronomy 23:24-25, I ruled that he could use his neighbor’s things to keep alive or escape but that he could not sell them off or destroy them. He could not damage his neighbor’s potential source of revenue and sustenance to satiate his own hunger. I believe that interpretation lines up with 

• Philippians 2:4 HCSB  Everyone should look out not only for his own interests, but also for the interests of others.

There is one major restriction to binyan av; it is only applicable if both of the verses are required to establish the halakha. If the second verse simply repeats the first, adding nothing, then no further conclusions may be drawn (unless of course the dayan can use semuch’in). 

• Binyan av mi katub ehad
  

This is when we apply a provision that is found in one passage only to passages which are related to the first in content but that do not contain the provision in question. 
Example: The owner of an ox is liable for the damages caused by the ox even if the damages it inflicts occur somewhere other than where the owner originally had the ox housed. Similarly, on is liable for the damages caused by an unprotected pit or by some inanimate obstacle he erected in the public domain. By combining these two laws we can come up with a third that if a person places an obstacle in the public domain and it causes damage somewhere else than where the person originally placed the object, then that person may still liable to some degree. 

• Binyan av mi shene ketubim
  

The is the same as the preceding (binyan av mi katub ehad) except that the provision is generalized from two biblical passages. 

Other considerations:
Anything introduced as a comparison to illustrate and explain something else, is in return also better explained or elucidated. One passage shining light on another is in return clarified. 

Sometimes something important is compared to something unimportant in order to clarify the unimportant thing. This is rather like ad absurdum in which you take an idea to its most extended end to show the follow or weakness of the idea. In this case, light is shed on the unimportant thing but we generally do not modify our conception of the important thing. In this case, contrary to the previous statement, the light is only shed in one direction. 
 

• Ke yotzei bo mimakon ach'er
  

Similarity in context to another Scriptural passage. The similarity in context may indicate similarity in interpretation. 

• Klal Ufrat – (sometimes spelled uprat) a generality and a particularity. A general category followed by a specific example.
  

If we find a phrase stating specific limitations following that of a generality, the particularity limits the generality in its scope by the detail or details; and we only take that particular case into account. In other words, when a general statement is followed by a particular detail or qualifier, the latter is specific to the former and merely defines it more exactly. 

Example: When playing a game (general) of chess (specific), one must follow the rules. 

Do we say that the specific example is given so as to limit the application of the general category leaving us open to the possibility that we may not have to follow rules in other games? Or do we say that the specific example is no more than an illustration of that application?

Example:

• Leviticus 1:2 HCSB  "Speak to the Israelites and tell them: When any of you brings an offering to the LORD from the livestock, you may bring your offering from the herd or the flock.

Since the word “animals” is a general category, whereas the words “herd” and “flock” are specific examples, all sacrifices must meet the criteria of the specific examples. So, when a general category is offered followed by a specific example, we rule that the latter serves as a qualification of the former. 

• Prat Ukhlal -a particularity and a generality. A specific example followed by a general category.  
  

Again, is the specific example given so as to limit the general law, or do we say that the specific example is an illustration of the general category’s practical application?  

Example:

• Deuteronomy 22:1-3 HCSB  "If you see your brother's ox or sheep straying, you must not ignore it; make sure you return it to your brother.  (2)  If your brother does not live near you or you don't know him, you are to bring the animal to your home to remain with you until your brother comes looking for it; then you can return it to him.  (3)  Do the same for his donkey, his garment, or anything your brother has lost and you have found. You must not ignore it.

If the order is first the particularity and then the generality, we add from the generality upon the particularity, even to a broad extent. When a detail is followed by a generalization, we follow the generalization and do not limit the application to the specific detail as in klal ufrat. This allows us to illustrate a principle with specific cases.

Example: Like chess (specific), when playing any game (general), one must follow the rules. 

• Klal Ufrat Ukhlal – a generality, a particularity and a generality:
  

A generality that requires a particularity, and a particularity that requires a generality. Unlike klal ufrat where the particularity dominates or prat ukhlal where the generality dominates, there are cases where the detail and generalization are interdependent for their meaning. In these cases both are considered part of a whole expression. If there is a particularity inserted between two generalities, we only add cases similar to the particularity. This is a combination of binyan av and klal ufrat. In this case the generalizations are limited by characteristics of the particular. 

Example: When playing a game (general), chess, checkers, Monopoly (specifics), dice (general), one must follow the rules. In this illustration, all the specifics are board games. The general example cited is not. Therefore law X (by this example) does not necessarily apply to games that are not played on boards (i.e. baseball) or even to dice games that do not require a board (i.e. craps). 

• Kol Davar Shehayah Baklal Veyatza Lit'on To'an Echad Shehu K'inyono, Yatza Lehakel Ve-lo Lehachmir  
  

If a specific example was already included within a general category, and it is then cited in a context similar to the general category.

Example: For example, the Torah (Shemos 2I:12) states: 

• Exodus 21:12 HCSB  "Whoever strikes a person so that he dies must be put to death.
  

No differentiation is made between intentional and unintentional killing. Later, the Torah states:

• Deuteronomy 19:4-5 HCSB  "Here is the law concerning a case of someone who kills a person and flees there to save his life, having killed his neighbor accidentally without previously hating him:  (5)  If he goes into the forest with his neighbor to cut timber, and his hand swings the ax to chop down a tree, but the blade flies off the handle and strikes his neighbor so that he dies, that person may flee to one of these cities and live.
  

The second verse teaches us that unintentional killing is not a capital crime. This rule is then applied to the general category cited in the first verse and qualifies it, limiting the punishment for killing to cases where it can be demonstrated that it was committed intentionally.

Had the second verse specifically stated that only one who kills intentionally is to be put to death, we might have seen its citation as being a klal ufrat. However, by telling us that a person who kills unintentionally remains alive, we infer that the punishment cited in the first passage only applies to one who kills intentionally. Thus the second passage is not so much a limitation but a clarification and as such we understand that it was revealed this way to teach us to be lenient rather than stringent. So when a specific example clarifies details of a general category, we rule leniently and not stringently. 

NEED EXAMPLES OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:
So, when the specific which is implied in the general, is especially excepted from the general, it must serve to emphasize some property that characterizes the specific. 

On the other hand, the specific that is implied in the general is frequently excepted from the general to elucidate some other specific property, and to develop some special teaching about it. 

• D’var halameid mi’inyano Vedavar Halamed Misofo– definition from context of total passage.
  

Inferences may be deduced from the context or from the subsequent text. This would be an argument where the context of the passage is used to understand and interpret a single, unclear or difficult verse; a matter that is inferred from its context, and a matter that is inferred from its ending. An ambiguous text or application can be explained by the context in which it appears or often in the terms of the statement of the next verse. 

Example: For example, the Torah states:

•  Exodus 20:15 HCSB  Do not steal.
  

The text does not specify whether this prohibition applies only to the theft of objects or includes kidnapping as well. Since the inclusion of stealing can be found within the context of You shall not murder and You shall not commit adultery - both of which are capital crimes - we infer that the prohibition also pertains to kidnapping, which is specified elsewhere[20] to be a capital crime.

• Sh'enei ketuvim - standard from two passages
  

This is a decision where two laws that seem to contradict are settled by another verse which resolves the conflict. The resolution of two Scriptures that contradict each other must wait until a third Scripture arrives and resolves their apparent contradiction. 
Also, in one concept is compared to two others, the best part of both of the latter forms the tertium quid of comparison. That is, their combined contribution forms something which cannot be classified into either of the two groups and considered exhaustive. Their commonality forms a third concept that is indeterminate in other contexts. 

Example: We are told in one verse:

• Genesis 1:1 HCSB  In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
  

Yet later it is written:

• Genesis 2:4 HCSB  These are the records of the heavens and the earth, concerning their creation at the time that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens.
  

Which came first? The heavens or the earth? Genesis 1:1 seems to indicate that the heavens (i.e. space) was created first. Genesis 2:4 implies that earth was created first. One verse seems to contradict the other. However, if we turn to a third verse we find:

• Isaiah 48:13 HCSB  My own hand founded the earth, and My right hand spread out the heavens; when I summoned them, they stood up together.
  

Yahweh created both at the same time and thus there is no contradiction. I have found that this principle applies eschatalogically as well. When two separate predictions seem to run in contradictory order (i.e. famine, plague, earthquake) then the order is irrelevant because they will happen in near simultaneity. 

• Midrash Hahigayon Derivations based on logical analysis of the text.
  

Example: The Torah states 

• Deuteronomy 24:6 HCSB  "Do not take a pair of millstones or an upper millstone as security for a debt, because that is like taking a life as security.
  

We interpret this as meaning that we many not remove any item that would either prevent the person from eating or from earning their living as a means of surety. 

Example: Midrash hahigayon may also shed light on:

• Exodus 12:6 HCSB  You are to keep it until the fourteenth day of this month; then the whole assembly of the community of Israel will slaughter the animals at twilight.
  

It is not likely that millions of people would be able simultaneously participate in the ritual slaughter of a single animal. Surely one person slaughtered it on behalf of the others. Therefore we understand this to mean that an action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the one who appointed him. Ethically speaking then any action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the person(s) who appointed the agent. 

Therefore, if our nation appointed a group of soldiers to perform an action in another country, and that group of soldiers murdered, raped and looted during that action, until we deal with them appropriately, our entire nation also bears their culpability. 

Additional methods of derivation:

Everything that was within the general rule and was excluded from the rule to teach us a rule, we don't consider this rule as pertaining only to this excluded case, but to the entire general case. Something that was included in a generalization, but was explicitly specified to teach something, was intended not to teach about itself, but about the entire generalization. In this case, if there is a set of rules involved in a generalization, and one of those rules has a specific point, then the point applies to all the rules, not as an illustration of the specific point. 

Anything that was included in a general rule, and was excluded to be susceptible to one rule that is according to its subject, it is only excluded to be treated more leniently but not more strictly. This is to identify specific cases in the generalization where exemptions or lighter treatment might occur. 

Anything that was included in a general rule and was excluded to be susceptible to one rule that is not according to its subject, it is excluded to be treated both more leniently and more strictly. Here a specific and absolute criterion or measurement is set for a case within the generalization. Depending on the circumstances, that measurement may be lenient for some and strict for others.

Anything that was included in a general rule and was excluded to be treated by a new rule, we cannot restore it to its general rule unless Scripture restores it explicitly. When a specific case changes a generalization radically, it is considered separate for the generalization unless the Torah explicitly states that the generalization is to be followed in all other ways, where the case is considered instead of a specific exception. 

Other Textual Techniques
Dabar meyuhad bi mekomo
An expression which occurs in only one passage can be explained only by the context. If it is not clearly explained in the immediate context, the we must understanding in another passage, preferably treating the same issue or at the very least written by the same author. A passage may be supplemented and explained by a parallel passage. However, a passage also serves to elucidate and supplement its parallel passage. Clarification is a two-way street. See also D’var halameid mi’inyano Vedavar Halamed Misofo above.

Dabar shehu shanuy (repeated expression)
Repetition implies special meaning. So, for example, if the concept of "to whom much is given much is required" is repeated over and over again in varying forms (e.g. Not many should desire to be teachers considering that they incur a stricter judgment) - it might me something worth keeping in mind!

Derek kezarah
Sometimes abbreviations are used in the text when the subject of discussion is considered self-explanatory to the author. This may appear as a truncated form of a longer proverb or a brief paraphrase of a concept or illustrating story. Also, a statement with regard to a part may imply the whole. Or a statement concerning one thing may hold good with regard to another as well. 

Gematria
Interpretation according to the numerical value of the letters. Adonaists do not use this particular tool. 

Historical References
The Scriptures are unique in two regards. All talmidim, because of their association with Attiq Yomin, are acutely aware of their long history with Him and refer back to points in time that may be quite remote. For instance, how many times do we refer to Adam and the first sin? The second unique characteristic is the use of prophecy to refer to points in time that have not yet occurred. Because of these two issues, the student must be very careful that he or she knows not only the time frame that is local to the author but also the time frame to which the author's mind was bent. I have found that this kind of "twist" in time reference can happen even in the midst of a clause! One must also keep in mind the possibility of "near/far" interpretations where the person was talking about a situation right in front of them while simultaneously teaching about another issue that is removed in quality or time. For instance, Jesus looking at Peter and saying "Get behind me Satan." Or 

Mi ma'al
Interpretation through the preceeding.

Mi neged
Interpretation through the opposite. 

Mi'ut (limitation)
The particles "ak", "rak", and "min", indicate that something implied by the concept under consideration must be excluded in a specific case. 

Mi'ut ahar mi'ut (limitation after limitation)
A double limitation indicates that more may be omitted. 

Notarikon
Interpretation by dividing a word into two or more parts. This is rare and only to be used with great caution. It can only be done in the original language. 

Postposition
If the larger context warrants it, phrases which follow may be regarded as properly preceding and interpreted accordingly. So long lists of values, virtues or steps down a slippery slope may be interpreted in different directions according to the point of the derash. 

Ribbuy (extension)
The particles "et", "gam", and "af", which are superfluous indicate that something which is not explicitly stated must be regarded as included in the passage under consideration, or that some teaching is implied thereby. 

Ribbuy ahar ribbuy (extension after extension) 
When one extension follows another it indicates that more may be regarded as implied. 

Siddur she nehlak
If the translator's punctuation does not seem to logically divide a clause or sentence within the text one should consider alternative punctuation or word order. This must of course be guided by the immediate context, the book's larger context and the general teaching of the Holy Scriptures. 

[1] Numbers 12:14
[2] Deuteronomy 25:17
[3] Esther 9:28
[4] Ezekiel 18:20
[5] Exodus 22:11
[6] 1 Chronicles 10:3-4
[7] assisted; Judges 9:52-56
[8] 2 Samuel 17:23
[9] 1 Kings 16:16-19
[10] Matthew 27:4-5
[11] Isaiah 49:5; Jeremiah 1:5; Psalm 139:13-16; Proverbs 16:9; Matthew 10:29-31; Romans 9:11; Galatians 1:15
[12] Genesis 1:26-27; 9:6
[13] Psalm 127:3-5
[14] Deuteronomy 30:19; 1 Corinthians 15:25-26
[15] Genesis 9:5-7; Proverbs 24:11-12; Exodus 20:13; 21:22-25
[16] Romans 15:1
[17] 1 Corinthians 11:2; 2 Thessalonians 2:15
[18] 1 Corinthians 11:2; 2 Thessalonians 2:15
[19] Proverbs 11:14; 24:6
[20] Deuteronomy 24:6 

Pardes is an ancient method of Scriptural interpretation. Pardes is an acronym that stands for PeshAt (simple facts), Remez (hints), Derash (search or teaching) and Sod (hidden or spiritual). The word itself is Hebrew for “orchard” implying that this method of study will yield great fruit. Peshat is the simplest meaning of a passage of Scripture. It’s most literal, historical and grammatical meaning. For example, “An angel appeared to Zacharias” means simply that. The angel doesn’t represent a concept or force. Zacharias does not represent the nation of Israel. An angel appeared to a man named Zacharias. That is the “peshat” of that verse. Remez means “hint”. A method of Biblical interpretation based on finding hints in the Torah for various concepts. We ask ourselves, “what principle does the peshat imply?” For instance, because Yahweh is the God of all nations, Moses’ instruction to the people of Israel to teach their children the ways of the Lord is not merely for Israelis but may be applied to all humans. Remez leads us to conclude that Biblical education is a universal duty.
Derash comes from the root that means “to interpret.” The derash would be the application of a verse. For example, in John 1:14 we read, “The Word became flesh and took up residence among us. We observed His glory, the glory as the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth.” A missionary might consider the “derash” of this verse to be that, like the Master, he too needs to attempt to attempt to “walk in the shoes” of the natives he is trying to reach, and condescend to be one of them though he has the right to live a more comfortable life. Or a person who is struggling with their tongue might consider the “derash” of John 1:14 to be that he needs to work at balancing grace and truth in his conversations with others. There are probably an unlimited number of scriptural derash and we need to be sensitive to the leading of the Holy Spirit and the plain teaching of the Scriptures in order to get the best derash possible. Derash is contrasted with peshat, which is the literal meaning of the words.

The sod interpretation would be a spiritual, symbolic or metaphorical meaning of a Scripture passage. For example the sod of the story of Isaac, Abraham’s beloved son of the promise, bearing the wood of his own sacrifice up Mount Moriah is a prophetic type of God’s only begotten, well-loved son bearing the wooden cross to his own sacrifice on Mount Calvary. Or a person seeking for the sod interpretation would be looking for an overarching hierarchical principle of which the passage before him is only one example.